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The Theory of Value Dilemma:
A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law
Dan M. Kahan*
Criminal law can justly lay claim to being the native domain of law and
economics. From Bentham to Becker, no area of law has been more brightly
illuminated by the radiance of economic logic.
Not coincidentally, in no other area of the law has the conflict between
economics and ordinary moral sensibilities been perceived to be so sharp. When
we are deciding how to apportion punishment, our instinct is to look backwards:
wrongdoers should be condemned in proportion to the reprehensibility of their
acts. I'll call the position that punishment should flow directly from these
intuitions intrinsic value retributivism. Economics, in contrast, uses the forward-
looking idiom of deterrence: punishment is justified if and to the extent that it
produces a desired state of affairs; if the optimal degree of punishment so derived
is out of synch with intuitions about the reprehensibility of a particular crime, so
much the worse for those intuitions.
My goal in this essay is to demonstrate that economic analysis lacks the
conceptual resources needed to criticize intrinsic value retributivism in this
fashion. The economic theory necessarily presupposes some theory of value that
tells us what states of affairs we are trying to maximize through punishment. To
construct that theory, the members of a community must consult their shared
intuitions. Once a theory of value so derived is plugged into deterrence theory,
however, the results won't differ in any material respect from the ones the law
would produce if informed explicitly by intrinsic value retributivism.
This claim, which I'll call the theory of value dilemma, can be reduced to three
sub-claims. The first is that the economic analysis of criminal law depends on an
externally specified theory of value; without some account of what state of affairs
the law is trying to maximize, the consequentialist logic of deterrence can't get off
the ground. Second, this theory of value is essentially political; that is, there's
nothing internal to an economic approach that justifies discounting the valuations
implicit in the decisions of a democratic political community's legal institutions,
and hence nothing internal to economics that forecloses political advocacy of any
particular theory of value. And the third and final sub-claim is that these
politically derived evaluations will, as a practical and conceptual matter, always
dominate the distinctive normative components of the economic theory of
deterrence. I'll discuss each of these points in turn.
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* 1. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DETERRENCE NEEDS A THEORY OF VALUE
Imagine two intentional killers: a woman who, in anger, kills the sexual abuser
of her young child; and a white man who, out of racist hatred, kills an African-
American man for dating a white woman. How would we determine the appro-
priate punishments from an economic perspective? One thing that economics tells
us is that to deter a crime of a particular sort, the expected penalty-that is, the
severity of the punishment discounted by the probability that it will be imposed-
must exceed the gain to the offender.' Assume that the angry mother (and others in
her situation) and the racist man (and others in his) get roughly the same psychic
returns from their killings, and that the probability of detection in their two cases is
roughly the same (close to one). Does economics imply under those circumstances
that the two killers should receive the same punishment?
Not necessarily. We must determine, in addition, what value society gets
from deterring these types of killings.2 Society might attach relatively little value
to the lives of child molesters; private acts of retaliation against them might make
members of society happy and help to deter further child molestation. If so, then
the social benefit of deterring deadly violence against child molesters might be low
or even negative. The social benefit from deterring deadly attacks on African-
Americans, in contrast, might be high: members of society might attach a relatively
high value to the innocent victims of such killings, and experience intense anger
and fear in response to the -racist motivations that underlie them. If so, then it
might make sense economically for society to devote less (indeed, perhaps none)
of its (inherently limited) punishment resources to punishing the angry mother, for
the social benefit of deterring her type of killing is less than the benefit of deterring
the racist man's.
Of course, matters could be otherwise. Maybe members of society are even
less disturbed by the racist killings than they are by vengeance killings of child
molesters, in which case economics might justify punishing the angry mother more
severely. Or maybe they disvalue these killings equally, in which case the
punishments should in fact be equal. The point, however, is that from an economic
view the right level of punishment in these particular cases depends critically on
how bad members of society take the underlying crimes to be.
And the same can be said in every other type of case. Unless we know
whether and how much we disvalue a particular species of conduct, we can't
determine whether the cost of deterring any particular amount of it is worth paying.
Nor can we make a rational judgment about how to allocate punishment resources
1 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
183-84 (1968); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 179, 184 (Hafner Publishing Co. 1948) (1823).
2 See generally BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 171 (punishment is unjustified "[w]here it is
unprofitable, or too expensive: where the mischief it would produce would be greater than what it
prevented.").
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between crimes that impose different levels of harm.3 The economic approach to
deterrence, in short, presupposes a consequentialist theory of value.
2. THE THEORY OF VALUE Is ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL
That theory of value, moreover, is necessarily political. I mean this in two
senses.
First, the theory of value is political in derivation. It's possible, of course, to
derive such a theory from philosophy or theology or some other source that is
putatively independent of politics. What's distinctive of economics, however, is its
commitment to taking individual valuations as given and aggregating them for
purposes of determining what's socially valuable.4 The market is thought to be the
best mechanism for aggregating preferences when voluntary exchange is possible;
democratically produced laws are preferable when such exchanges aren't feasible
or fail to make the actors internalize all the relevant costs. This isn't to say that
democratic politics is a perfect mechanism for producing efficient laws, any more
than it is to say that the market is the perfect mechanism for measuring efficient
exchanges. But it is to say, for reasons that economists fully appreciate,5 that it's
unlikely we can come up with institutional mechanisms for maximizing social
welfare that do any better.
Second, the theory of value is political in nature. That is to say, the valuations
that an economic theory of deterrence presupposes are open to perpetual
contestation across all criminal-lawmaking institutions.
This is the case, in part, because of the imperfection of each lawmaking
institution relative to the others. We might expect the judgments that a legislature
would make about the respective harms associated with revenge killings of child
molesters and racist killings of African-Americans to be an accurate reflection of
the valuations of society's members generally; but a host of political dynamics,
from inertia to interest-group rent-seeking, prevents us from concluding this with
confidence. Individual juries are relatively immune from inertia and rent-seeking,
but are less representative of the community as a whole and less sensitive to
intensity of preferences than are legislatures. Judges, even when elected, are likely
to be less responsive to the electorate than are legislators and less representative of
3 See generally id. at 181 ("The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense,
which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.").
4 See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REv. 76 (1977).
5 On the tendency of legislation toward efficiency, see DONALD A. WITrMAN, THE MYTH OF
DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT (1995); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983);
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); on the
tendency of judicial decisionmaking toward efficiency, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (4th ed. 1992); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
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the community than are juries; yet this very insularity from politics makes judges
suitable representatives of citizens' "second-order" preference for the enforcement
of higher principles (e.g., mercy and racial equality) that at least sometimes trump
the immediate desires of the electorate.6 Accordingly, the decision of not one of
these institutions can be held forth as embodying the community's "true"
aggregate valuation, which is in fact more likely to emerge from overlapping
jurisdiction and competition among these institutions. 7
In addition, the theory of value used to ground deterrence theory needn't
remain static. Even if we could be confident that democratic institutions had, for
today, accurately gauged the community's aggregate valuation of a particular
crime, it's possible those institutions would produce (or could be made to produce)
a new result tomorrow as individuals' valuations changed. For that reason, too, the
theory of value reflected in the decisions of democratic political institutions
remains subject to perpetual contestation.
Another way to make the point is to say that nothing in the economic approach
constrains anyone to accept the extant theory of value reflected in law, or prohibits
anyone from advocating any particular new one. Race-of-the-victim disparities in
juries' capital sentencing verdicts might reveal (as some have argued) that society
places less value on the lives of African-Americans or poor people.8 But that
doesn't show (contrary to what others have suggested9) that welfare maximization
justifies accepting such disparities. For if the people who serve on juries could be
persuaded to alter the sentences they impose, or if legislatures or even courts could
be persuaded to adopt rules of law that force juries to change their verdicts to
eliminate the disparities, we could just as well say that the new sentencing
outcomes reveal another, higher valuation of the relevant victims' lives, and that
enforcement of that valuation is welfare-maximizing. Because theories of value
are political in both derivation and in nature, anyone can argue for whatever theory
of value they choose, consistent with the economic theory of deterrence.
3. THE THEORY OF VALUE DOMINATES DETERRENCE
My first two claims are sufficient to show that the economic conception of
deterrence can never be fully autonomous of moral intuitions. To make optimal
deterrence judgments, society needs a theory of value. That theory of value
6 See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
7 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
8 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1441 (1988) (concluding that race-of-victim disparities in
frequency of death sentences show that "in Georgia's marketplace of emotion the lives of blacks
simply count for less than the lives of whites.").
9 See John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy be Able to "Buy Justice"?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307,
1311 n.7 (1987).
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necessarily is the aggregation of citizens' intuitions about the reprehensibility of
different crimes. Moreover, since society's theory is politically determined,
nothing internal to the economic view precludes an individual from advocating that
deterrence judgments be based on a theory of value derived from her particular
intuitions.
I haven't yet demonstrated, however, that the economic conception of
deterrence dissolves into intrinsic value retributivism. Intrinsic value retributivism
holds that punishments should be based solely on intuitions about the
reprehensibility of offenders' crimes. Even if informed by a theory of value
constructed from such intuitions, the economic conception of deterrence could, in
principle, generate punishments different from those society would arrive at if it
were to apply common intuitions directly. Imagine that racist killers face a
substantially higher likelihood of being caught and derive substantially less
psychic utility from killing than do mothers who kill child molesters. Under those
circumstances, the economic conception of deterrence might justify punishing the
vengeful mother more severely than the racist killer even if society attaches less
value to deterring the killing of child molesters than it does to deterring the killing
of innocent persons who happen to be African-American.
What I want to show now is that deterrence theory lacks sufficient strength,
conceptually or practically, to alter the path of common intuitions in this way. My
final claim is that the external theory of value on which optimal deterrence
judgments depend will always dominate the decisionmaking criteria internal to
deterrence theory. This will be so, first, because individuals will always have
better information about their theory of value than they will about the factual
issues distinctive of deterrence judgments; and second, because the disutility
associated with overriding their moral intuitions will always cancel out any
marginal social-welfare gains associated with crediting counterintuitive deterrence
judgments.
a.Deterrence decisions under uncertainty. The economic conception of
deterrence requires two sorts of determinations. One is how penalties of various
sizes affect the incidence of an offense; this "penalty responsiveness"
determination hinges on (among other things) the gain various classes of offenders
derive from a particular kind of crime, and the likelihood that persons who commit
such a crime will be apprehended and convicted.1° The second determination is
how bad various crimes are. As I've argued, this theory-of-value determination is
necessary in order to assess whether the deterrence gains associated with a
particular penalty are worth the cost of imposing it, and how limited punishment
resources should be allocated across crimes.
A decisionmaker-whether a citizen, a legislator, a juror, or a judge-will
always have better information on the valuation of a crime than on the components
of penalty responsiveness. The reprehensibility of various types of crimes turns
entirely on one's intuitive appraisals of them; to figure out, for example, which is
'o See Becker, supra note 1.
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worse-revenge killings of child molesters or racist killings of African-
Americans-all one has to do is introspect. Introspection won't yield reliable
answers, however, to the questions on which penalty responsiveness depends.
Who really gains more (and exactly how much more) from his or her crime-the
racist killer or the vengeful mother? Who is in fact more likely (and exactly how
much more) to be caught and convicted? These are complex empirical questions,
and answering them requires us to come to terms with possibly immense
evidentiary and methodological difficulties."
Because decisionmakers are bound to be more confident of their valuations of
crime than they are of their assessments of penalty responsiveness, their deterrence
judgments will invariably be dominated by the former. This conclusion follows
from our best psychological account of how persons actually make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty, and is perfectly compatible with how individuals should,
as a normative matter, make such decisions according to conventional economic
theory.
Cognitive psychology tells us that individuals tend to conform their factual
beliefs to their values. Individuals who place a high value on the autonomy of
markets and other private orderings, for example, discount evidence that
unregulated commerce poses a danger to the environment. 12 Those who think
smoking is glamorous are less likely to believe empirical evidence that it causes
cancer. 13 Individuals who see conformity to traditional, hierarchical social roles as
entitling persons to status and respect are more likely to credit the claim that social
deviancy promotes social disorder. 14
Various mechanisms explain this phenomenon. Because values are likely to
be more firmly held than factual beliefs, resolving uncertainty about the latter
consistently with the former helps to avoid cognitive dissonance. 5 Social and
cultural affinities reinforce this bias. Confronted with competing and offsetting
empirical assertions that they aren't in a position to verify first hand, individuals
rely on those whom they trust for guidance. The people they trust, unsurprisingly,
are the ones who hold the same values they do, and who, likewise, instinctively
resist the tragic conclusion that what's immoral might be beneficial, or what's
moral, harmful. 16
11 See generally Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 702 (1980).
12 See Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and
Why?, 119 DAEDALUS 41 (1990).
13 See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 185-86 (7th ed. 1995).
14 See Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 12.
15 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. (1982) (suggesting that cognitive dissonance deflates
demand of workers to be compensated for accepting occupational risks). See generally LEON
FESTNGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
16 See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985);
MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982); Geoffrey Cohen, Party over
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Studies of attitudes toward capital punishment confirm that these same
dynamics influence beliefs about deterrence. Although the issue has been
extensively researched, there isn't conclusive evidence one way or the other on
whether the death penalty deters relative to life imprisonment. Nevertheless,
citizens generally hold confident opinions on this question, which correlate with
whether they believe that the death penalty is a morally appropriate penalty for
murder independently of its deterrent effect.17 Indeed, experimental data show that
individuals confronted with conflicting empirical evidence on the deterrent effects
of the death penalty credit the evidence that confirms their prior beliefs and
discount the evidence that conflicts with them.'"
Values also have been shown to influence beliefs about the effect of gun
control. Control supporters cite evidence that gun control reduces violence by
disarming criminals, while opponents assert that it increases it by disarming law-
abiding citizens who could use weapons for self-defense. Which side's data one
finds more credible depends on whether the prospect of widespread private gun
ownership denigrates or affirms one's vision of a well-ordered society.' 9
There's no reason to expect decisionmakers (whether voters, jurors,
legislators, or judges) to behave differently in other settings that require them to
make deterrence judgments. If they are deciding how to allocate punishment
resources between vengeful mothers and racist killers, they will predictably
conform their speculations about the gain that these respective types of offenders
receive from offenses and the likelihood of their evading apprehension to their
(more certain) beliefs about the intrinsic reprehensibility of these offenders'
respective crimes.
Nor can they be faulted for doing so on the best economic account of how
rational individuals should make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
Bayesian theory tells individuals how to update their probabilistic judgments
(relating, e.g., to the various components of penalty responsiveness) as they
encounter new information. Expected utility theory says that they should then use
these judgments to determine the course of action (here the apportionment of
Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 808 (2003); Robert J. Robinson, Dachter Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus
Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism " in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 404, 405, 415 (1995).
17 See generally Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 L. & Soc. REv. 21 (1982); Phoebe C. Ellsworth &
Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, J. Soc.
ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 19.
18 See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Leper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 11 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979).
19 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory
of Gun-RiskPerceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (2003).
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punishment resources across different offenses) that yields the highest expected
payoff.
20
But while this strategy of decisionmaking tells individuals what to do with
relevant and reliable information, it doesn't tell them when they should regard
information as relevant and reliable. To avoid infinite regress, individuals must
determine on some basis independent of rational decision theory what information
merits inclusion in the rational-decisionmaking algorithm. Accordingly, a
decisionmaker who is disposed to credit penalty responsiveness data when they
cohere with her convictions about intrinsic reprehensibility and to discredit them
when they don't, isn't doing anything that a rational choice economist can object
to. Indeed, if that's the form of information filtering that makes her "feel"
best--because, say, it minimizes cognitive dissonance, or aligns her most
comfortably with others with whom she identifies--then presumably she's doing
exactly what she should be doing to maximize her utility.
b. The disutility of counterintuitive judgments. Imagine, though, that members
of society devised a "value neutral" mechanism-perhaps an expert agency,
manned by dispassionate and "world-viewless" econometricians-to gather
information about the determination of penalty responsiveness internal to
deterrence theory. Imagine further that the information suggested that it made
sense on optimal deterrence grounds to punish some offense more severely than
some other one that citizens would otherwise have deemed more intrinsically
reprehensible. On the basis of the new information, the citizens might revise their
intuitions about what level of punishment is just in the two cases. But if they did
not, and if they remained convinced that the more intrinsically reprehensible of-
fense should be punished more severely, would enforcing their intuitions be
contrary to the normative prescriptions of economics?
No, because ignoring the citizens' collective preference for the intuitively just
level of punishment in the two cases would reduce social welfare. If, on the whole,
society decides that they'd rather punish the racist killer more than the vengeful
mother, notwithstanding the dictates of deterrence theory, then nothing in the
economic analysis of law prevents them from accepting the trade off between
optimal deterrence and the satisfaction of that intuition. Likewise if they choose to
punish the mother more severely than the racist in the face of deterrence theory.
Indeed, in both cases, their decision can be understood to reveal a new, upwardly
revised assessment of the value of averting the types of killings committed by the
offender whom they have chosen to punish more severely. For this reason, too, the
external theory of value dominates the normative criteria internal to deterrence.
4. WHAT ALL OF THIS AMOUNTS To
Put together, my claims demonstrate that the economic analysis of criminal
law lacks the power to criticize intrinsic value retributivism. We can't make
20 See HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
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optimal deterrence judgments without a theory of value. Theories of value are
always politically contestable; any argument about what's worse than something
else can fairly be asserted and fought for. Because the decisionmaker will always
have more information about her theory of value than about the other
considerations relevant to optimal deterrence, her theory of value will always
dominate her analysis. So, although it's thereafter possible for her to reconstruct
her conclusions in deterrence terms, those conclusions will, in fact, be derivative
from the decisionmakers' intuitions about what crimes are more reprehensible than
others. So we might as well just talk about what's more reprehensible than what,
which is to say, we might as well talk intrinsic-value retributivism.

